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Iran and Four Historical Models of Nuclear Breakout

Pakistan, Libya, Syria and Iraq as comparative frameworks for thinking about Iran’s trajectory.

English translation of the Hebrew original.

Some thoughts for the weekend:

Looking at countries that attempted a nuclear breakout, we can identify four historical models and use them to analyze which model Iran fits today, and where it goes from here.

1. The Pakistani model

In the 1970s, Pakistan began a secret nuclear program, primarily in response to India’s success in acquiring nuclear weapons.

The United States applied heavy diplomatic pressure, imposed sanctions, and withheld technological assistance. But it avoided a military strike because Pakistan was an important ally in the Cold War.

The result: in 1998, Pakistan conducted an official nuclear test. Today, it is reported to possess more than 150 nuclear warheads.

2. The Libyan model

Gaddafi attempted to develop nuclear weapons around the 1990s through secret cooperation with Pakistan and North Korea. After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, he realized he might end up like Saddam, yielded to international pressure, and decided to dismantle the program.

The result: Libya did not become a nuclear state. In addition, in 2011, Western countries invaded Libya and overthrew Gaddafi’s regime.

3. The Syrian model

In the 2000s, Assad built a secret nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance in the Deir ez-Zor region in the country’s north. In 2007, Israel struck and destroyed the reactor in a complete surprise attack, “Operation Outside the Box.”

The result: Syria never again attempted to develop nuclear weapons, and in 2024 the Assad regime fell.

4. The Iraqi model

Saddam Hussein developed nuclear weapons with French assistance in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1980, Iranian aircraft made an initial attempt to strike the reactor, which failed.

In 1981, Israel struck and destroyed the reactor in what became known as “Operation Opera.” But Iraq did not give up and secretly tried again.

Only in the 1991 Gulf War, after the United States conquered Iraq, was the program finally eliminated.

The result: an early strike delayed Iraq, but only military action to overthrow the regime closed the matter for good.

Where Iran fits

Over the years, Iran tried to follow precisely the Pakistani model:

Developing a secret, dispersed infrastructure, playing negotiating games, stalling for time, and making steady progress under the West’s nose. Its goal was to acquire nuclear weapons without paying the prices Assad and Saddam had paid. Pakistan showed Iran that this was indeed possible.

The West and the United States, by contrast, believed until a week ago that diplomacy and sanctions could move Iran toward the Libyan model.

But Iran saw what happened to Gaddafi. More recently, it received another reminder from Ukraine, a country that also voluntarily gave up nuclear weapons.

The likelihood of the Iranians voluntarily abandoning their nuclear program through diplomacy approaches zero.

In Iranian eyes, regime survival equals nuclear weapons.

Israel understood that there was no real basis for negotiations with Iran, and that, on its current trajectory, Iran would become Pakistan within weeks or months.

The Israeli strike on Iran automatically moved Iran into one of two models: Syria or Iraq.

If we are to assess the likelihood of each model materializing, I would estimate that the chance of the Iranian regime abandoning its nuclear program after the strike is very low.

That leaves the Iraqi model.

The Iraqi model means that, even after we deal a devastating blow to the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranian regime will not give up its nuclear ambitions.

It may take time: years, perhaps a decade. But the Iranian regime will continue trying to develop its nuclear program in secret and wait for another opportunity to realize it. Perhaps the end of Trump’s term? Who knows.

Therefore, even an American strike on Fordow would not fundamentally change the picture. It might affect the motivation and time required to rebuild the program, but it would not end it.

So when America commits to ensuring that Iran will not become nuclear, it is effectively committing to overthrowing the regime in Iran.

That does not have to happen tomorrow, but it will probably happen in the future.

And this is the real dilemma facing America:

Everywhere the West has overthrown a regime—from Iraq to Libya to Afghanistan—the result has been years of chaos and, above all, a great deal of American soldiers’ blood.

Does the United States want to embark on such an adventure in Iran? It probably very much does not.

We will probably find out very soon what Uncle Sam ultimately decides to do.

But if we base our assessment on the short historical record, no country that has suffered a military strike on its nuclear program has subsequently managed to realize it.

The sample is admittedly very small, but history usually repeats itself.


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